2 hypoxia which can result in cerebral palsy or the baby's death. In this case shoulder dystocia occurred at the end of an arduous vaginal delivery, and both risks came to fruition. Injury to the brachial plexus resulted in paralysis of Sam's arm, and the umbilical cord became trapped, depriving him of oxygen, so that he was clinically dead at birth. Sam was resuscitated, but suffered renal damage and epileptic seizures, and cerebral palsy affected all four limbs. Mrs Montgomery's pregnancy had been closely monitored at a combined obstetric and diabetic clinic, under the supervision of her consultant obstetrician, Dr McLellan. By the thirtysixth week it became apparent that the baby's estimated weight placed him within the ninety-fifth centile, and from at least that time Mrs Montgomery had questioned Dr McLellan about the prospects of being able to deliver such a large baby naturally. Dr McLellan responded by reassuring Mrs Montgomery that vaginal delivery should be possible, but that if difficulties were encountered during labour then they might resort to caesarean section. She did not tell her of the chance of shoulder dystocia and associated risks. Dr McLellan testified that Mrs Montgomery had not asked her about particular risks, and that, had she been so questioned, she would have informed her about these specific possibilities. However, it was not her practice to volunteer such information when a patient was expressing more general concerns because; 6 if you were to mention shoulder dystocia to every [diabetic] patient, if you were to mention to any mother who faces labour that there is a very small risk of the baby dying in labour, then everyone would ask for a caesarean section, and it's not in the maternal interests for women to have caesarean sections. Adjusting its perspective from that of the reasonable doctor to that of the reasonable patient, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the reasonable expectant mother would wish to know that she was subject to a 9-10% risk of shoulder dystocia. Even although this eventuality could almost always be managed safely, no woman would contemplate the methods of doing so "with equanimity". 25 The court also determined that, had she been told of this risk, Mrs 
Against this background Mrs

C. ESTABLISHING BREACH OF DUTY AFTER MONTGOMERY
Common sense dictates that medical assessment of the mathematical probability of a given outcome must continue to provide some sort of baseline in establishing breach of duty to warn, but in demonstrating whether a given risk was sufficiently material, patients no longer need address themselves to the views of the doctor "of ordinary skill". Instead (and this may transpire to be no more straightforward) they must persuade the court that a reasonable person in those circumstances would have perceived the risk as significant in terms of.
27
…the nature of the risk, the effect which its occurrence would have on the life of the patient, the importance to the patient of the benefits sought to be achieved by the treatment, the alternatives available, and the risks involved in those alternatives. The assessment is therefore fact-sensitive, and sensitive also to the characteristics of the patient The patient's case is not undermined by failure to ask the doctor the right questions.
Doctors are obliged to use "dialogue", so that, without "bombarding" patients with "technical information", they nonetheless "ensure" that the patient understands the gravity of the condition and the risks and benefits of the alternative treatments available. 28 As Dr McLellan pointed out, many patients now "google" their suspected condition, arriving at their consultation with a range of queries on possible treatments, and it is the doctor's duty to respond to such detailed questioning as far as possible. However, the court regarded it as "unreal" to place the "onus of asking on a patient who may not know that there is anything to ask about". 
6
On the other hand, doctors do not need to discuss risk in detail with patients who make it plain that they do not want further information. 30 Moreover, a "therapeutic exception" is made for circumstances of necessity, such as where a patient is unconscious, and also where disclosure would be detrimental to a patient's health -possibly where full disclosure might aggravate an anxiety-related condition. 31 However, the scope of such exceptions is to be narrowly construed and must not be abused.
32
The Supreme Court accepted that such a wide-ranging test for disclosure reduced the predictability of the outcome of litigation, but this was to be tolerated as the price of "respect for the dignity of patients". 33 The court also predicted, perhaps rather optimistically, that having participated in such "dialogue" patients would "take responsibility" for their ultimate choice of treatment, and so "recriminations and litigation" would become less likely. 34 (It might equally be anticipated that dissatisfied patients will claim that this dialogue negligently failed to meet one of the requirements now stated as applicable to it.)
One uncomfortable issue left open is how exactly duty is to be tailored to the "reasonable person in the patient's position". The Supreme Court specifically noted that Mrs
Montgomery was a "clearly highly intelligent person", a graduate in molecular biology and a hospital specialist in the pharmaceutical industry. 35 Moreover, her mother and sister were both general medical practitioners, and her mother had accompanied her on occasion to the antenatal clinic. The implication was that Mrs Montgomery's understanding of medical risk was more sophisticated than that of the average patient. Is this type of background information now relevant as part of the profile of the "reasonable person in the patient's position"? If so, is there a lesser duty to disclose to patients with no scientific qualifications and no relatives in the medical profession? As the arbiter of duty the reasonable doctor at least had a claim to objectivity;
replacing that person with the reasonable patient raises unanswered questions as to the legitimacy of subjective considerations in this assessment. 
7
D. CAUSATION
In cases of failure to disclose the essential causal enquiry is straightforward: if the patient had been properly informed, would she have made a different choice of treatment and thereby have avoided the harm? Of course only the patient knows the answer to this question, and it is entirely natural that in hindsight he or she should believe the answer to be "yes". The Lord Ordinary was sceptical of Mrs Montgomery's own interpretation and deduced that she would probably have opted to try for a natural delivery even if she had known of the risk of shoulder dystocia.
36
However, he dealt with this question only very briefly since he had in any event determined that there had been no breach of duty of care. The Supreme Court took the unusual step of setting aside the Lord Ordinary's finding of fact. It read Mrs Montgomery's testimony alongside Dr
McLellan's assessment, cited above, 37 that "everyone" advised of the potential discomfort of shoulder dystocia would ask for a caesarean section, and on that basis it held that Mrs Montgomery would have done so also. It was therefore satisfied that Dr McLellan's breach of duty in failing to mention this possibility caused the damage to Sam.
The difficulty in this case, however, was that the damage occurred as the result of a much smaller risk wrapped up within the larger risk. There may have been a 9-10% possibility of shoulder dystocia, but the risks of Sam's particular injuries affected only a tiny proportion of that 9-10% -risks so small as likely to be non-notifiable where they arise as standalone phenomena.
Nonetheless, Montgomery seems to indicate that where such minimal risks come to pass as a further complication of a more common condition which the doctor should have disclosed, the ensuing damage is not too remote a consequence of that breach of duty, and the tests for factual and legal causation are satisfied.
E. CONCLUSION
To the credit of the medical profession, the obligations stated in Montgomery are more or less consistent with the statements of good practice already set out in its professional literature. 38 In most cases the judgment imputed to the "reasonable person in the patient's position" is unlikely to diverge greatly from that imputed to the reasonable doctor. 
9
For the time being, however, all medical staff advising patients need to be aware that there is no simple rule on a specific level of risk that triggers the requirement to disclose. In judging which information to disclose and which to withhold they must make comprehensive efforts to ascertain the patient's perspective on what they want of their treatment -and, of course, to document that they have done so.
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